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Abstract 
 
This paper offers a technical exploration of the empirical ramifications of adopting the 
Career Shares approach to long term incentives – a proposal that has emerged from 
the discussion of the structure of incentive pay in the light of the recent financial 
crisis. By simulating the impact of such a design of long term incentives in the context 
of those FTSE350 CEOs whose careers terminated between 1993 and 2008, it is 
shown that Career Shares automatically introduce a ‘settling-up’ effect that adjusts for 
late-career or post-career periods of poor performance. The adoption of such an 
arrangement would require Remuneration Committees to adjust the overall 
remuneration package in the light of tax and risk bearing consequences that result. 
This paper offers the first attempt to confront an interesting and promising new idea 
(Career Shares) with empirical data that reflects the actual careers followed by a 
group of CEOs. 
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Introduction 
 
The role of incentive pay has emerged as among the chief suspects in most analyses 
of the causes of the recent financial crisis.  Criticism has focused less on the size of 
the rewards at stake and more on the short time horizon between recorded 
performance and payout.  In response to this perception, the G-20 encouraged the 
cross-national adoption of remuneration standards in the financial sector as laid out by 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2009, 2010) and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB, 2009).  These added to the momentum already given in some countries to the 
reform of remuneration in this area (e.g., by the Walker Review, 2009, in the UK).  In 
all of this, the essential thrust is towards deferring the majority of bonus payments, 
using significant vesting periods for incentive pay, and ensuring greater provision for 
reclaiming bonus payments that were awarded on the basis of performance in an 
earlier period that, in the event, turn out not to have been justified – something known 
as clawback.  Although aimed specifically at the financial sector, it is widely expected 
that these influences will affect executive remuneration practice more widely. 
In the USA, in addition to signing up to the G20-backed reforms, efforts were 
made to contain the level of incentive payments in those companies covered by the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) by limiting incentives to one-third of the 
annual remuneration received by executives (US Treasury, 2009).  This limit could be 
exceeded if the incentive was in the form of Restricted Shares not vesting until after 
all outstanding TARP obligations had been met.  One of the innovations emerging 
from this experience was the separation of vesting and transferability – a feature 
similar to what will be described below in terms of Career Shares vesting (the 
ownership transferring to the director) and their being able to be cashed in (Murphy, 
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2009, 2010).  The overall thrust of reform is towards deferred payments, with deferral 
involving periods of significant length. 
Reflecting these policy initiatives, two academic contributors to the debate 
have offered a new perspective on incentive pay by suggesting that incentive 
alignment could be improved by moving from a typical three-year vesting period 
towards a significantly longer arrangement.  Bhagat and Romano (2009) recommend 
that long term incentive awards should not vest until two to four years after the last 
day in office (retirement or other exit from the firm).  Bebchuk and Fried (2010) 
suggest that it would be sufficient to have a pre-agreed extension period after vesting 
before the executive is permitted to cash-out the majority of the incentive award – the 
authors allude to a period of 10 years after vesting.  Both papers point to a range of 
companies that have used similar practices in the past (Boeing, Citigroup, Exxon 
Mobil, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch).  
Such delayed vesting or delayed cash-out arrangements not only ensure that 
executives build and ever increasing stake in their company as their time in post 
lengthens, but also guarantee an automatic ‘claw back’ effect, as subsequent poor 
performance reduces the value of earlier incentive awards before they can be cashed 
out, or realised.  The automatic or programmed nature of this approach also makes it 
difficult for the executive to manipulate the timing of the exercise of options and/or 
the release of corporate news so as to advantage themselves (Bebchuk et al., 2010; 
Lie, 2005; Lomax, 2008).   
To investigate the empirical scope of such an approach, this paper applies a 
variant of these proposals (Career Shares) in the context of the actual completed 
career histories recorded by CEOs in the UK FTSE350 during the period 1993-2008.  
These actual career histories (start-dates and end-dates) are utilised in conjunction 
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with each company’s performance as recorded in the London Stock Price Database 
(LSPD).  The following section discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the 
approach.  There is then a section that introduces the data and explains the 
calculations made in arriving at the results presented.  The results themselves are 
available in a separate section, and the paper ends with a discussion of the policy 
ramifications of these results and a brief conclusion. 
 
Incentive pay and career performance 
 
The use of pay-for-performance for executives was originally seen as a remedy for the 
principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) that arises when the 
professional management of a company lacks both an adequate ownership stake in the 
company and effective direct supervision (i.e., in most widely held public companies).  
Delivering part of executive pay in the form of equity instruments (shares or options), 
which do not vest to the executive (pass into ownership) until a time some years in the 
future, creates a beneficial alignment of interest between the executives and the 
owners.   
Initial analysis of the arrangements in place for CEOs in the USA (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990) produced estimates of the pay-performance connection that were seen 
as empirically too modest to support this as a realistic view of executive pay. This led 
the authors to suggest that CEOs were paid more like bureaucrats (according to the 
size of their company) than anything else. But the shareholder-value movement of the 
1980s and various tax considerations (Murphy, 2002) caused companies to adopt a 
more aggressive use of executive share options, Restricted Shares, and Performance 
Shares. 
For clarification, executive share options grant the executive the right to 
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purchase shares in the company is, three years time, at the share price prevailing at the 
time of the grant.  There may be additional performance conditions, but continuing 
employment with the company is almost always required (ABI, 1994). Restricted 
Shares are essentially zero-priced options in the sense that with no payment necessary 
the ownership of these shares vests or transfers to the executive after a set period – 
usually three year.  Again continuing employment is required. Performance Shares are 
simply Restricted Shares where the proportion of the granted shares vesting at the end 
of the period is contingent of the satisfaction of certain performance conditions over 
and above merely staying in the employment of the company.  It was the expansion in 
the use of these types of incentive arrangements that enabled later studies to 
demonstrate that the pay-performance effect in CEO pay was indeed empirically 
significant (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Hall and Murphy, 2000).  
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) report that the performance related component 
of executive pay in the USA grew from 37% in 1993 to 57% by 2003.  Conyon et al. 
(2010) report that much of the USA-UK difference in the level of CEO pay can be 
explained by the higher amounts of equity pay used in the USA.  But even in the UK 
the use of incentive pay in the board room has increased markedly.  Following what 
was interpreted as critical comment in the Greenbury Report (1995) concerning the 
use of executive share option schemes, companies moved to adopt Performance Share 
plans.  Booker and Wright (2006) report their adoption in 52% of FTSE100 
companies by 1999, rising to 84% by 2005.  Some of these companies replaced their 
option schemes with Performance Share plans, others utilised both.  Gregory-Smith 
(2009) reports that in 2005 incentive pay accounted for over 50% of median executive 
remuneration in his sample of FSTE350 boards. 
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Statistical studies of the effectiveness of boards in linking the pay of their 
executives to company performance continue to record mixed results.  Meta studies 
based on the large numbers of papers in the area (Tosi et al., 2000; Rost and Osterloh, 
2009) fail to find a significant connection.  Given the aggressive expansion of the use 
of equity-linked CEO pay, these results appear surprising and have recently been 
challenged by Clementi and Cooley (2009), Core and Guay (2010), and Nyberg et al. 
(2010) who emphasise the importance of including all of the CEO’s equity in the firm 
(prior unvested grants as well as current grants) and of getting the timing right 
between the realisation of the share and option gains on the one hand, and 
performance over the period covered by such grants on the other. 
While there may remain a number of critics who doubt the efficacy with 
which share-based rewards are administered in the boardroom, seeing the process as 
being hostage to managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), the overwhelming 
importance of this component of pay suggests that the career vesting proposals 
discussed here (Bebchuk and Fried, 2010; Bhagat and Romano, 2009) have a key role 
to play in the design of executive pay.  
Most long term incentive arrangements are based on an award whose value 
depends on the share price of the company in three years’ time. Career Shares may 
appear similar in that they involve the award shares now and ownership may transfer 
in to the executive in three years time, or so, much as in other schemes.  But they key 
difference is that with Career Shares it is not possible to cash in the value of these 
shares until a set time (possibly one, two or four years) after the executive retires from 
or otherwise leaves the company.   
Figure 1(i) reveals the logic of Career Shares in schematic form.  Outstanding 
performance throughout a career results in ‘reward’, as shares are cashed out at an 
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appreciated price.  Poor early performance followed by further later career 
disappointment results in an effect we label ‘holding their feet to the fire’ as any 
shares that vested early in the career are required to be held through further periods of 
disappointing performance rather than being free to be cashed in, as would be the case 
with Restricted Shares.  The bottom left diagonal entry reveals a ‘settling-up’ effect as 
shares that may have been worth a lot after an early period of good performance see 
their value fall owing to subsequent poor performance.  The reverse effect is seen in 
the top right box where a ‘forgiveness’ effect is achieved, whereby shares that vested 
early at a poor price see their value recover as the share price rebounds owing to 
superior performance later in the career. 
------------------------------ 
                                               Insert Figure 1 about here 
                                               ------------------------------ 
The extension of vesting, or more precisely cashing-in restrictions on 
incentive shares clearly suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Career vesting of incentive share awards will enhance the ex-
post reward of more successful CEOs and reduce the reward of less successful 
CEOs. 
 
The second part of Figure 1 records similar incentive effects, but this time 
contrasting the overall performance during the career with the outcome in the period 
immediately after retirement or exit from the company.  It is here that problems of ill 
considered succession or imperfect long-term strategy can manifest.  The results are 
similar to those discussed above, but here  we label the effect ‘clawback’ to 
emphasise the post-career aspect of the adjustment wherein what was initially a high 
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reward is revised downwards in the light of subsequent disappointment.  This leads to 
Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: By extending the cashing-in restriction of Career Shares to 
cover a period subsequent to the exit of the CEO from the company, an 
automatic clawback of reward can be effected that reflects any disappointing 
outcome experienced after the CEO leaves the company. 
 
One claim that is made for the Career Shares approach is that it removes the 
endogeneity of timing of the release of company news and/or the granting of equity 
related incentives. Yermack (1997) and Lie (2005) both drew attention to suspicious 
activity around option grant days. Subsequent SEC investigation proved this to be the 
case and reporting requirements were tightened up (Herron and Lie, 2007; Lomax, 
2008).  But this may be an overstated claim, as well organised and publicised award 
and vesting schemes of any type should be immune from this criticism – it is a matter 
of governance. 
The Career Shares arrangement does satisfy the Core and Guay (2010) critique 
that the timing of the pay event and the period of performance measurement are 
frequently mismatched.  Save for the extension beyond the end of the CEO career, 
pay and performance are exactly matched.  And, of course, the period immediately 
following exit from the firm can be viewed as reflecting some aspects of the CEO’s 
performance while in office. This is, of course, the advantage of taking the whole-
career perspective offered by Career Shares. 
To keep the focus on the question of career-length vesting, only grants of 
shares will be considered in the following calculations.  The relative role of shares 
versus options in the recent financial crisis is still being debated, but early evidence 
seems to suggest that the distinction between shares and options played little or no 
role in engendering excessive risk taking (De Young, 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stultz, 
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2009; Suntheim, 2010). In the basic Career Shares approach, no additional 
performance condition would be imposed other than remaining in employment.  As a 
variant here, however, career vesting will be assessed in the context of a relative 
performance hurdle (where the performance metric is total shareholder return, TSR), 
an arrangement that has become common for Performance Shares in the UK.  This 
variant (requiring vested shares not to be cashed in until the end of the career, or later) 
will be labelled Career Shares_Plus.  In each of the variants, it is hypothesised that the 
pay-performance connection will be enhanced: 
Hypothesis 3: Career vesting of incentive share awards produces a pay-
performance relationship that is stronger than conventional three-year vesting 
patterns in either Restricted Shares or Performance Shares. 
 
Details on data and estimation are given in the following section.  
 
 
Data preparation and calculation 
 
The sample comprises all CEO careers ending between 1993 and 2008 at companies 
that were in the FTSE350 during that period. Even if the company subsequently drops 
out of the index, it is still maintained in the sample. All CEO departures from these 
companies are recorded, and the original start-date of each departing CEO is 
identified.  Interim CEOs are ignored, as are any careers lasting less than 6 months.  
In the resulting 1,448 CEO careers, the typical length is remarkably brief, with an 
overall median of 4.1 years and mean of 5.4 years. At all times, however, there are 
long serving CEOs observed in this sample – the longest completed career observed is 
34 years long, and in no year does the maximum tenure of an exiting CEO fall below 
16 years. 
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The London Share Price Database (LSPD) is used to identify the performance 
of the company over the duration of each CEO career (and potentially for up to 4 
years following the exit of the CEO, if the company maintains a listing for that length 
of time).  The rewards resulting from each CEO’s career performance are computed 
so that the impact of pay incentives can be studied (and long term incentives, in 
particular, where long term incentives involve the award of shares whose ownership is 
tied to the continuing employment through a period and the satisfaction of additional 
performance conditions over that period),  To facilitate comparability, the incentive 
scheme in question is assumed to take the form of an annual award of Restricted 
Shares and to follow the same pattern in all companies.  In each year, it is assumed 
that the CEO is awarded £100k worth of equity (in real terms, valued at 2008 prices), 
with a normal vesting period of three years.   
Restricted Shares are assumed to vest and, under the conventional approach, 
be cashed in at the prevailing share price at the end of the three-year life of each 
tranche.  To add an alternative context, however, it is also possible to subject such 
vesting to a relative performance condition (‘Performance Shares’ as opposed to 
simply ‘Restricted Shares’).  The condition used for Performance Shares  is that the 
company’s total shareholder return (TSR) over the period should at least match the 
median of the FTSE All-Share over the corresponding period for any vesting to take 
place.  Vesting starts at 30% for median performance and rises to 100% for upper 
quartile performance (again in terms of the FTSE All-Share constituents), with pro-
rata vesting for positions between.  This arrangement is representative of many long 
term incentive schemes currently in place at FTSE companies. 
Vesting is computed by reference to the total shareholder return of the 
company over the appropriate period, as found in the LSPD.  This implicitly assumes 
 12
that the executive is awarded dividends arising from unvested shares (a now common 
practice – lest the CEO allow such considerations to influence dividend policy).  For 
Restricted and Performance Shares, it is also assumed that, on exit from the CEO 
position (for whatever reason), all outstanding unvested shares vest pro-rata to the 
period served.  Thus, exiting one year into the life of a recently granted three-year 
tranche would result in  the quantum of shares at stake being reduced to one-third and, 
where performance conditions were in force, the company’s performance would be 
gauged relative to the FTSE All-Share over the year just completed (but with the same 
conditions relating to median performance etc.). 
It is then relatively straight forward to compute the difference in outcome 
between the standard three-year vesting  and the ‘career + n-months’ vesting of 
Career Shares (where ‘n’ is the number of months post exit during which the cashing 
in of incentive shares is prohibited).  The remaining challenge is to make the resulting 
numbers comparable by reducing each to the equivalent measure of worth in real 
terms, at 2008 prices.  The first issue to confront is that the two approaches to vesting 
(every three years versus career vesting) result in executive reward being realised at 
different times.  Under the conventional approach vesting leads to realised gains on an 
annual basis throughout the CEO career.  In the second approach, all shares (no matter 
when granted) are cashed-out at the end of a ‘career + n-month’ period. 
This timing issue is dealt with by compounding the gains realised in the first 
approach at a rate representing the opportunity cost of the funds. The rate used is the 
return realised by the FTSE All-share index over the corresponding period.  This is 
taken to represent the opportunity costs of funds, and is used to compute the present 
value of realised gains under conventional vesting, computed through to the ‘career + 
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n-month’ cash-out date allowed for Career Shares under the Bhagat and Romano 
(2009) proposal. 
 In summary, two distinct scenarios are examined.  In one, the CEO receives 
regular awards of career shares which must be held until a given period after 
retirement or exit from the firm.  In the calculations below, this period may be 12 
months, 24 months, or 48 months after the CEO career ends.  It is then a simple 
matter to value the shares at the prevailing share price and express this in real terms at 
the 2008 price level.  In the second scenario, CEOs again receive regular awards of 
shares which subject to performance conditions vest (i.e., become the property of the 
CEO) at the end of a three-year holding period.  The CEO is then assumed to cash 
these in at the prevailing share price and invest in a diversified portfolio of shares as 
characterise by the FTSE All Share index.  The cumulated value of these holdings are 
then computed at a comparable time to the career shares (so, at 12, 24, or 48 months 
after the CEO’s exit from the firm) and expressed in constant 2008 prices. 
 
 
Findings 
 
For each CEO, there are several distinct possible arrangements of long term incentive 
explored here.  The focal arrangement will be labelled Career Shares and, as 
described above, involves the CEO receiving an annual award of unvested shares 
which cannot be cashed in until, variously, the end of the CEO’s career or some 12, 
24, or 48 months after that termination.  This is contrasted with a similar annual 
award of Restricted Shares (which are free to be cashed in after  a three-year vesting 
period).   
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A further comparison pair is created by considering the Career Shares 
approach in the context of Performance Shares.  This results in with what we label 
Career Shares_Plus, where the shares that would vest, subject to the performance 
hurdle, at the end of each three-year vesting period are held until the ‘career plus n-
month’ cashing out point.  This can be contrasted with the more traditional award of 
Performance Shares (again with a three-year vesting period, but where shares are free 
to be cashed in then and there). 
Table 1 reports the difference between rewarding with Restricted Shares and 
with Career Shares.  To aid comparability, the comparison is restricted to CEOs with 
roughly the same length of tenure in the job (between three and six years on 
completion of CEO career; 447 CEOs in total).  The table divides CEOs by whether 
or not performance in their first year in office was above median FTSE350 TSR.  
Their final year in office is assessed in a similar way.  This results in four groupings 
of CEOs. 
The impact of the settling up effect is clear, with CEOs who start out well but 
end up badly receiving on average £112,944 less under Career Shares than under 
Restricted Shares.  Similarly by ‘holding their feet to the fire’, Career Shares reduce 
the average payout to consistently poorly performing CEOs by £59,064, as shares that 
might otherwise have been cashed out are required to be held through what is a 
further period of disappointing performance. This confirms the predictions of Figure 
1(i).  Both the forgiving effect (+£45,451) and the reward effect (+£48,137) 
demonstrate how Career Shares maintain an incentive to perform through to the end 
of the career.  The analysis of variance F-statistics show that the final-months effect is 
the statistically significant driver of the outcome. 
------------------------------ 
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                                               Insert Table 1 about here 
                                               ------------------------------ 
The same exercise can be repeated in terms of Performance Shares and Career 
Shares_Plus.  The results are displayed in Table 2.  The overall conclusions remain 
unchanged, although the size of the impact of the Career Shares_Plus aspect of long 
term incentive design is more muted as the overall reward is reduced in magnitude 
owing to the performance conditions imposed. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 above, 
the reward of successful CEOs is enhanced and that of less successful CEOs is 
reduced through the use of Career Chares. 
------------------------------ 
                                               Insert Table 2 about here 
                                               ------------------------------ 
To examine the empirical impact of the post-career restriction on cashing out 
company shares, Table 3 examines the impact of such a restriction on the valuation of 
Career Shares.  The restriction period here is two years. The Table divides CEOs by 
those who out-performed the FTSE during their career and whose companies went on 
to out-perform the FTSE in the 24 months following their exit from the company.  
The clawback effect imposed on those CEOs whose good career performance is let 
down by a post exit period of underperformance can be seen to average -£198,316.  
This outweighs the upper left cell average result of £91,845 (holding their feet to the 
fire), as the stakes here were already low, given that these CEOs had already recorded 
a disappointing career. Both effects are significant, and consistent with Hypothesis 2 
above. In the right hand column, the forgiveness effect can also be seen (£195,980), as 
strong post-exit performance restores the fortunes of those who otherwise might have 
taken little away.  We will discuss below whether this effect is always merited. 
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------------------------------ 
                                               Insert Table 3 about here 
                                               ------------------------------ 
Finally, Figure 2 uses the results from the entire sample to plot (where the 
firms survived long enough) the impact of the post-exit restriction period on the value 
of realised reward.  The data are examined post exit at +12-months, +24-months, and 
+48-months respectively.  Figure 2 splits firms by whether they have realised a 
positive TSR from the CEO’s exit to the point of observation, and reports the 
percentage impact that the delayed cashing in period has had on the value of their 
holdings.  The power of the clawback effect is apparent (with continuing 
underperformance resulting in mounting loss of reward – reaching a median -42% for 
companies recording a negative return at the end of four years), but the result is 
enforced by the rising value of the successful firms (where the median reward rises by 
+24%, through +37% to +58% by the end of the fourth year).  There is both a carrot 
and a stick in this incentive effect. 
 In a final examination of the workings of Career Shares, Table 4 reports the 
observed pay-performance sensitivities from a series of simple regressions of the 
logarithm of reward from long term incentives on the observed total shareholder 
return over the period (the career, or the career plus the extended restriction period).  
In all cases, the coefficients are statistically significant and the Career Shares version 
produces a stronger pay-performance relationship.  More importantly, however, the 
difference between the coefficients is always statistically significant as measured by a 
Chi-squared test set in a seemingly unrelated regressions framework (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009, p156). The conclusion from these results is that, consistent with 
Hypothesis 3 above, the Career Shares aspect of long term incentives significantly 
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improves the strength of the pay-performance relationship.  This is true whether the 
context is that of Restricted Shares or Performance Shares. 
------------------------------ 
                                               Insert Table 4 about here 
                                               ------------------------------ 
 
Discussion 
 
The results above demonstrate that the restriction on cashing-out of equity-based 
remuneration, under the arrangement that has been labelled above as ‘Career Shares’, 
can have a quantitatively significant impact on the final reward enjoyed from a CEO’s 
career.  Career Shares are seen to deliver certain features that are generally seen as 
desirable in an incentive scheme.  These include a ‘settling up’ effect whereby the 
value of rewards vesting on the strength of early promising performance is reduced to 
reflect any subsequent reversal in fortunes of the company.  There is also a ‘holding 
their feet to the fire’ aspect whereby the inhibition against cashing out early rewards 
ensures that continuing poor performance has a compounding effect on those early 
rewards.   On the other hand, the ‘forgiveness’ effect means that a disappointing early 
period can always be compensated for through subsequent outstanding results.  The 
potential of early incentives remains in force throughout the career.  Finally, those 
who perform well continuously throughout their career will receive a fulsome reward 
at career’s end. 
The further feature of Career Shares, namely extending the inhibition on 
cashing out of share awards through to a period after exit from the firm, further 
enforces these results and also ensures that a subsequent failure in performance, 
owing to a poorly arranged succession or to a strategy that goes off the rails, will lead 
to a clawback of reward. 
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 The poor connection between pay and performance has long been lamented in 
the literature (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006; DTI, 2003; Edmans and Gabaix, 2009).  
Some have blamed the outcome on abuse of managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004), while others call into question the effectiveness of the whole approach (Rost 
and Osterloh, 2009) and suggest a more direct approach to managing the boardroom 
process (Epstein and Roy, 2004). But the majority of research suggests that directors’ 
remuneration is an important, if perhaps poorly implemented device to address the 
agency problem and elicit a top management team performance that is aligned with 
shareholder interests (Conyon et al., 2010; Conyon and Murphy, 2000, Core et al., 
2005).  A key aspect of such an alignment is seen to be the structure of the 
remuneration arrangements (Buck et al., 2003), and, in particular, the long term nature 
of the design of incentives (Thorley Hill and Stevens, 1995).  The evidence presented 
here illustrates that the Career Shares arrangement for director remuneration can 
achieve this desired alignment of reward with long term company performance. 
The approach adopted above ignores an important effect illustrated by Booker 
and Wright (2006) and Main et al. (2008) who demonstrate the significant difference 
to eventual vesting that a few days can make in the choice of the defining dates for a 
performance period.  This observation reflects the general finding of Acker and Duck 
(2007) and Dimitrov and Govindaraj (2007), referred to as the ‘reference day’ effect.  
The results reported above might have been very different for particular companies 
had our timing of share performance measurement commenced on a different day of 
the month.  It is less likely, however that the overall results would have been much 
different taken over a sample of the size used here.   
The results presented here have the merit of using actually observed CEO 
careers in conjunction with the recorded performance of each company when that 
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CEO was in charge, in a way that allows a new way of remunerating directors to be 
evaluated.  Future studies may be able to incorporate the actual levels of reward 
granted to each CEO over their career rather than utilising a counterfactual standard 
award as assumed here.  This would call for further data collection and would also 
raise the issue of comparability across companies. 
Several further issues regarding the robustness of the Career Shares approach 
remain and these merit highlighting. First, the reward achieved by a disappointing 
CEO may be resurrected if a successor CEO quickly turns the company around.  The 
same criticism can, of course, be made regarding any takeover premium enjoyed by a 
failing company that is subject to acquisition.  To the extent that the CEO has some 
influence in choosing a successor – customary, at least for internal succession – the 
arrangement provides an effective incentive to choose wisely.  On the other hand, 
career vesting will raise the stakes as to the timing of voluntary exit from the CEO 
position (say, into retirement) and this may provoke precipitously early exits or overly 
delayed departures.  
The Career Shares approach works by exposing the CEO to substantially more 
risk as to the company’s performance and this can be expected to require 
compensation in the form of higher base pay or salary.  There may also be tax 
consequences when Restricted Shares vest and yet must be carried through to the 
designated period some years after demitting the CEO position.  Again the company 
may well be required to compensate the executive for this liability (albeit with the 
possibility of claiming this back at the end of the process), or at least allow a partial 
cashing out of the CEO’s incentive shares to meet tax liabilities.  
One further issue concerns long serving CEOs who also tend to be among the 
better performing CEOs - otherwise they would have been long since let go (Gregory-
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Smith et al., 2009).  Long service CEOs will therefore tend to benefit 
disproportionately from career vesting.  This is, possibly, no more than it should be, 
but remuneration committees will be required to explain significantly larger cashing-
out events than are currently observed and for these individuals some early release of 
accumulated wealth may be appropriate.   
Career vesting introduces increasing amounts of risk into the CEO’s wealth 
prospects.  Whether caught by a cyclical downturn or by long term sectoral decline, 
the CEO is exposed to an unwelcome increase in uncertainty.  Companies may be 
required to compensate for this in the form of higher base salary.  For longer serving 
CEOs, boards may need to be aware that decision making in later career may be 
influenced by such large amounts of accumulated wealth at risk in the company’s 
shares (Conyon and Florou, 2004).  Thus, while the final payout to underperforming 
CEOs may be reduced in such arrangements, those more successful and longer 
serving CEOs will see their final payout increase considerably.  While much of this 
will be compensation not only for performance but also for the extra risk born, 
shareholders may look askance at such enlarged payouts.  Although four years may be 
empirically too long a period to fairly add to the CEO’s career-vesting arrangements 
(owing to the vagaries of the business cycle), two years may be a reasonable 
extension. 
While the Career Shares approach has much to commend it, there remain a 
considerable number of complications that await early adopters.  But the over all 
contribution of the three hypotheses examined above: the career balancing of reward 
and performance; the potential for post-career clawback and adjustment; and the 
overall strengthening of the pay performance relationship – represents a very 
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powerful contribution. It is an incentive arrangement with which most shareholders 
will be able to identify and which all will find transparent.  
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Figure 1 
Career Shares in operation 
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ii) Post Career holding period requirement 
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Table 1 
Impact of Career Shares versus Restricted Shares for CEOs with careers 
between 3 and 6 years in length 
 
 Outperforms 
FTSE median over final 12 months 
 
Outperforms  
FTSE median over 
initial 12 months 
 
No (under-perform)
 
Yes (out-perform)  ALL 
    
No (under-perform) -£59,064 £45,451 -£6,356 
Yes (out-perform) -£112,994 £48,137 -£37,300 
ALL -£85,911 £46,696 -£21,239 
  
F(2,444) = 33.85 [0.00]; initial 12 months effect F(1,445) = 2.57 [0.11]; final 12 
months effect F(1,445) = 64.15 [0.00]; 
Averages: Restricted Shares = £548,127;  Career Shares = £526,887 
For CEOs with a career lasting between 3 and 6 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Impact of Career Shares_Plus versus Performance Shares for CEOs with careers 
between 3 and 6 years in length 
 
 Outperforms 
FTSE median over final 12 months 
 
Outperforms  
FTSE median over 
initial 12 months 
 
No (under-perform)
 
Yes (out-perform)  ALL 
    
No (under-perform) -£30,824 £16,526 -£6,945 
Yes (out-perform) -£96,504 £33,166 -£35,589 
ALL -£63,521 £24,236 -£20,722 
 
F(2,444) = 17.19 [0.00]; initial 12 months effect F(1,444) = 2.70 [0.10]; final 12 
months effect F(1,444) = 31.00 [0.00]; 
Averages: Career Shares_Plus = £331,635;  Performance Shares = £352,358 
For CEOs with a career lasting between 3 and 6 years. 
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Table 3 
Average outcome of Career Shares – with 24 month post-career restriction 
 
 
 Outperforms 
FTSE median over post-career 24 months 
 
Outperforms  
FTSE median over 
career 
 
No (under-perform)
 
Yes (out-perform)  ALL 
    
No (under-perform) -£91,845 £195,980 £ 37,383 
Yes (out-perform) -£198,316 £390,813 £54,168 
ALL -£141,949 £283,655 £45,130 
 
   
F(2,270) = 47.61 [0.00];  Career effect F(1,270) = 0.34 [0.56];  Post career effect 
F(1,270) = 95.08 [0.00]. 
For CEOs with a career lasting between 3 and 6 years and whose companies are still 
publicly traded 2 years after the exit the firm. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Coefficients from simple regression of log-reward against period total 
shareholder return (TSR) 
 
        
Post-Career 
Restriction 
Regression 
Coefficient on TSR 
  Regression Coefficient on 
TSR 
 
 Restricted 
Shares 
Career 
Shares 
chi2(1) 
[prob.] 
Performance 
Shares 
Career 
Shares_Plus 
chi2(  1) 
[prob.] 
00_months 0.935*** 1.021*** 119.47 [0.00] 2.571*** 2.632*** 
44.55 
[0.00] 
       
12_months 0.806*** 1.024*** 398.44 [0.00] 2.167*** 2.309*** 
150.72 
[0.00] 
       
24_months 0.744*** 1.019*** 475.91 [0.00] 1.945*** 2.132*** 
204.59 
[0.00] 
       
48_months 0.695*** 1.031*** 493.31 [0.00] 1.746*** 1.975*** 
220.29 
[0.00] 
        
 
 N = 1482;  legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 29
 
Figure 2 
Post-career claw-back effect of Career Shares 
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